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PRE-EMPTION AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
REVISITED: THE 1975 WASHINGTON TANKER LAW

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Three judge district court, relying
on pre-emption, invalidated a Washington statute prohibiting
supertankers and regulating smaller tankers in Puget Sound. At
issue are the rights of states to legislate higher standards for tanker
operation in the face of the federal Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972 and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, - F. Supp. -, 7 ENVIR.
L. REP. 20071 (1976).
INTRODUCTION
The recent completion of the Alaskan pipeline raises, once again,
the spectre of oil spills from oceanic tankers. The catastrophic effects
of large oil spills on the marine environment have long been
recognized. Yet, the traffic in oceanic transportation of oil continues
to grow: whereas sea tankers in 1966 shipped 800,000,000 metric tons
of crude oil, that figure should grow to about 2.5 billion by the end of
this decade.' Moreover, not only does the growing number of tankers
increase the probability of an oil spill, but the potential damage of
such a spill increases because of the growing size of the tankers
transporting the oil.2
Recognizing this high potential for damage to the state's natural
resources, the State of Washington in 1975 enacted a series of statutes,
hereinafter referred to as the Tanker Law, designed to decrease the
probability and extent of oil spills in the Puget Sound 3 area. 4 The
three major provisions of these statutes are:
(1) A prohibition of the passage of any oil tanker in excess of
125,000 deadweight tons (dwt.) into Puget Sound; 5
(2) A requirement that a Washington-licensed pilot accompany
1. D. BOESCH, C. HERSHNER & J. MILGRAM, OIL SPILLS AND THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT 68 (1974).
2. S. REP. NO. 724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2772.
3. "Puget Sound" is defined as the waters east of a line extending from Discovery Island light
south to New Dungeness light. WASH. REV. CODE §88.16.190(1).
4. WASH. REV. CODE§§88.16.170etseq.
5. WASH. REV. CODE §88.16.190(1).
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any oil tanker of 50,000 deadweight tons or more during
operations in Puget Sound;6 and
(3) A requirement that any oil tanker between 40,000 and
125,000 deadweight tons must either meet certain design
and safety specifications
or be escorted by a suitable tugboat
7
contingent.
These statutes exempt oil tankers of less than 40,000 deadweight tons
8
from such controls.
In 1976, plaintiff Atlantic Richfield Company, in a proceeding
before a three-judge district court, 9 sought to enjoin the Tanker Law
on the grounds that federal regulation pre-empts such requirements,
that the requirements violate the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution, and that the requirements invade the foreign
affairs powers of the United States. 10 The court, in granting the order,
held the field pre-empted by federal regulation and, therefore, found
it unnecessary to reach the other two grounds. Thus, the court
declared the Tanker Law null and void. The State of Washington, as
defendant, has appealed to the Supreme Court." This paper will
examine the issues of pre-emption and state power in the field of
environmental protection in light of limitations embodied in the
Commerce Clause.
THE PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE
The evolution of the pre-emption doctrine spans a century and a
2
half, beginning with the seminal decision of Gibbons v. Ogden.1 It
now appears well established that, given a clear conflict between
federal statutes and state law (that is, where the laws are contradictory in the sense that compliance with both is impossible), the state
law must fall under the Supremacy Clause. 13 Real difficulty occurs,
however, when the state law concerns the same subject-area as the
federal statute but is in some way compatible with it. Such
compatability may result from the state's imposition of greater
requirements or, because most federal legislation is interstitial in
nature, from filling gaps in the federal legislation itself.
6. WASH. REV. CODE §88.16.180.
7. WASH. REV. CODE §88.16.190(2).
8. Id.
9. This case was heard before The Three Judge Court Act was modified by 90 Stat. 1119
(1976).
10. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans,
F. Sup.
_
7 ENVIR. L. REP. 20071 (1976),
prob. Juris. noted sub noma.Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 430 U.S. 905 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Atlantic Richfield].
11. Id.
12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Pre-emption must be distinguished from the more general limitation of state's power to legislate in the area of interstate commerce.
The latter limitation presupposes no federal legislative action; rather,
the limitation springs from prohibitions inherent in the Constitution
itself. Since regulation of interstate commerce is a concurrent power,
states may regulate as long as such regulation does not impose undue
burdens upon interstate commerce. That is, state legislation must not
invade the dormant powers of the federal government under the
Commerce Clause. Pre-emption, on the other hand, arises from both
the interstitial nature of federal legislation and the Supremacy
Clause. 14
A pattern of concurrent legislation in a common area often arises,
as in this case, when the state government legislates under its "police
powers"' 15 to protect the health, morals, and welfare of its citizens,
whereas the federal government legislates under one of its constitutionally derived powers (e.g., the power to regulate interstate
commerce).
16
Modern pre-emption analysis emanates from Mintz v. Baldwin,
which concerned restrictions imposed by New York on importation of
cattle from other states. Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction
because of an alleged conflict with the Federal Cattle Contagious
Diseases Acts. The court required the showing of pre-emptive intent:
7
the intention to pre-empt "must definitely and clearly appear."'
Although Congressional intent has since become the touchstone of
pre-emptive ability, difficulty arises in determining Congressional
intent. Generally lacking an adequate record of legislative intent, the
courts have enunciated several factors by which to gauge such intent:
(1) The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
states to supplement it;18
(2) The act may touch a field in which the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system is assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject; 19
14. But see Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959), where it is suggested that the Court may base its decision upon
pre-emption grounds to avoid the necessity of reaching another constitutional question. By this
method the Court shifts the burden of overriding a state law back to Congress.
15. The idea of inherent state "police powers" originated in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note
12. See also Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
16. 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
17. Id. at 350.
18. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946); Head v. Board of Examiners,
374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963).
19. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1956).
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(3) The need for national uniformity may appear from the fed20
eral legislation and thereby preclude the states from action;

and
(4) The state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the
object of federal statute.2 1
The issue of pre-emption of the pilotage portion of the legislation
will be examined first, as the attempt by Washington to regulate
pilotage clearly collides with federal legislation in the area. The
second part of the discussion, which involves "conflict" rather than
"collision," examines whether federal law pre-empts other parts of
the Tanker Law.
PilotageRegulations and Pre-emption
The second section of Washington's Tanker Law attempts to
regulate the navigation of medium and large tankers in Puget Sound
by requiring a Washington state licensed pilot on tankers of 50,000
dwt. or greater. Although pilotage is an aspect of interstate commerce, control of which is explicitly reserved to the federal govern23
ment, 22 it has been recognized since Cooley v. Board of Wardens
that, in the absence of federal regulation in the area, states are free to
legislate. The rationale behind such a doctrine is to allow states to
protect the integrity of their shorelines as well as to ensure the
general safety of navigation by preventing mishaps, such as oilspills,
which are precipitated by unknown hazards along the coasts. The
Cooley rule has been codified, 24 with the modification that states are
precluded from requiring local pilots on a coastwise seagoing stream
6
vessel, 25 and has withstood a long line of challenges.2
The opinion in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans ambiguously defines
the grounds on which it invalidates the pilotage provisions of the
Tanker Law. The court at one point observes that federal law, i.e., the
28
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972,27 pre-empts the field.
However, at another point, the court finds the pilotage section void
"[ijnsofar as the Tanker Law prohibits a tanker 'enrolled in the
20. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
21. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra note 18.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl.
3.
23. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
24. 42 U.S.C. §211 (1970).
25. 42 U.S.C. §215 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Anderson v. Pac. S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912); Warner v. Dunlap, 532 F.2d 767
(1st Cir. 1976); People v. MacDonald, 69 Misc.2d 456 330 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1972); St. George v.
Hardie, 60 S.E. 920 (N.C. 1908).
27. 33 U.S.C. §§1221 et seq. and 46 U.S.C. §391a.
28. Atlantic Richfield, supra note 10, at 20072.
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coastwise trade' from navigating in Puget Sound unless it has a local
pilot...."29

If the court is invalidating the pilotage provision on the latter
ground, its reasoning is more difficult to comprehend. The state
clearly has power to control foreign trade pilotage, even though it
does not for pilotage pertaining to coastwise trade, trade between
ports of the same country. 30 The Washington statute is phrased in
general terms and does not specifically exclude from its scope those
vessels engaged in coastwise trade. 3 1 Generally, a court should
construe a statute in a way which will square it with constitutional
demands. 32 However, the court has limits in construing an ambiguous
statute to bring it into accord with the Constitution; the court may
not act legislatively by limiting a generally inclusive statute to one
class or by excluding a class. 33 Moreover, it has been held that a
general statute which would be constitutional when applied to
intrastate commerce, but unconstitutional when applied to interstate
commerce, is void in its entirety when "the provisions in regard to
both classes of commerce are so connected that it cannot be presumed
that the Legislature would have passed the one without the
other." 34 Applying these principles, the Tanker Law section on
pilotage cannot stand in its present form; it directly conflicts with
federal legislation and therefore, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause,
is pre-empted. Certainly the state could rewrite the Tanker Law to
exclude vessels engaged in coastwise trade from the pilotage requirements. However, the impact would be minimal, since the primary
target of the law was undoubtedly the expected influx of oil tanker
traffic upon completion of the Alaskan oil pipeline. Moreover, even if
the statute were rewritten to conform with these constitutional
limitations, the issue of whether the area is pre-empted by the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act would remain; such a redrafted statute
would then survive or fail with the rest of the Tanker Law.
29. Id.
30. Petition of Canadian Pac. By. Co., 278 F. 180, 202 (D.C. Wash. 1921).
31. Indeed, the implication is that such vessels are included. WASH. REV. CODE
§88.16.180 reads "Notwithstanding the provisions of RCW 88.16.070 .. " WASH. REV.
CODE §88.16.070, in turn, excludes vessels under enrollment and vessels engaged exclusively in
the coasting trade.
32. American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 321 U.S. 90 (1946).
33. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.Co. v. Westby, 178 F. 619 (8th Cir. 1910). To sustain one part of
a statute and void another, three conditions must be met: (1) the sections must be separable
such that each may be read and may stand by itself; (2) the unconstitutional part must not be so
connected with the general scope of the statute to undermine the intent of the legislature if
stricken; and (3) no insertion of words or terms is necessary to separate the two parts, id., at 629.
34. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry.Co. v. Interstate Contracting Co., 257 N.W. 811, 812 (Minn.
1934).
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The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and Pre-emption
Analysis of the pre-emptive effect of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972, hereinafter referred to as PWSA, on the
Washington Tanker Law begins with an examination of whether the
federal and state statutes attempt to regulate in a common field.
Clearly, the State of Washington has a constitutionally derived
interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens. The drafting
of the Tanker Law explicitly recognizes such an interest: "the
Legislature finds that the transportation of crude oil and refined
petroleum products by tankers on Puget Sound creates a great
potential hazard to important natural resources of the state and to
jobs and incomes dependent on these resources." 3 5 Correspondingly,
Congress passed the PWSA "to protect the navigable waters and the
36
resources therein from environmental harm .....
With these similar objectives in mind, both Congress and the
Washington legislature enacted legislation concerning tanker operation. The statutes, at the least, overlap: each attempts to impose
minimum design specifications, to regulate pilotage, and possibly to
restrict vessels which, because of hazardous conditions, pose a danger
to the area. Thus, the two statutes are potentially conflicting.
However, the Washington Tanker Law can be interpreted, and was
probably intended to be, merely supplementary to the federal
legislation, prescribing only higher standards for vessels than the
minimum standards prescribed by Congress. As the State argued in
the case, much federal environmental legislation explicitly provides
for a system of "cooperative federalism" which encourages state
participation in the regulatory process and allows the state to enact
more stringent requirements than the minimum federal standards. 37
The pre-emptive effect of federal legislation in cases where a
possible conflict exists is determined by examining congressional
intent. The PWSA does prescribe a wide area of regulation of tanker
operations, design, and safety equipment; although the specific
requirements for these are not announced in the statute itself,
authority is delegated to the Secretary of the department in which the
Coast Guard is operating, presently the Department of Transportation, to develop the specific regulations. 38 The pervasiveness of the
regulatory scheme does seem to indicate that Congress intended its
regulation to be exclusive. Moreover, it may be argued that because
the area concerns foreign commerce and because of potentially direct
35. WASH. REV. CODE §88.16.170.
36. 33 U.S.C. §1221 (1970).
37. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857d-1 (1970).
38. Supra note 36.
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or indirect discriminatory effects upon inland states, the regulation of
tanker traffic in coastal ports demands national uniformity. The court,
in ruling against the state statute on the pre-emption ground, was
persuaded by these arguments.
Nevertheless, persuasive counterveiling arguments may be made.
First, the PWSA explicitly provides for potentially non-uniform
applications. It empowers the Secretary to "control vessel traffic in
areas which he determines to be especially hazardous, or under
conditions of reduced visibility, adverse weather, vessel congestion, or

other hazardous circumstances.

.

... 39

Thus, in enacting the PWSA,

Congress apparently did not intend to mandate national uniformity.
On the contrary, it foresaw local exigencies which logically preclude
ironclad rules.
So, the question of whether Congress evidenced an intent to
pre-empt by the pervasiveness of federal control in the area remains.
The scope of the PWSA obviously is broad. However, a provision of
Title I, which the court inexplicably ignored in its opinion, provides
that nothing in that title "prevent[s] a State or political subdivision
thereof from prescribing for structures only higher safety equipment
requirements or safety standards than those which may be prescribed
pursuant to this chapter [emphasis added]." 40
The question then becomes, to what extent did Congress intend to
allow states to supplement the PWSA? Title I appears to allow states
the freedom to impose more stringent safety standards. However,
Title II, which regulates vessels carrying bulk cargo, including oil,
which is determined to present substantial hazards to life and
property in the navigable waters of the United States, does not make
such an allowance: Moreover, Title, II explicitly recognizes the
necessity "that there be established for 'all such vessels documented
under the laws of the United States or entering the navigable waters
of the United States comprehensive minimum standards of design,
construction, alteration, repaii, maintenance, and operation to prevent or mitigate the hazards to life, property and the marine
environment [emphasis added]." 4 1 Thus, comparing Titles I and II,
it might appear that the states could enact more stringent requirements for vessels entering their harbors, but that they would be
precluded from legislating against vessels carrying dangerous cargoes.
There are, however, two arguments mitigating against this interpretation. First, if Congress recognized the state interest in controlling
vessels entering state ports by allowing more stringent requirements
39. 33 U.S.C. §1221(3) (1970).
40. 33 U.S.C. §1222(b) (1970).
41. 46 U.S.C. §391a(l) (1970).
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in general, that interest should be heightened when the cargo is
greatly more dangerous. Second, the wording of Title II is reminiscent of Title I: it concerns minimum standards. There is no mention
of uniform standards.
The most, then, that can be derived from this analysis is that the
intent of Congress is not clear, and arguments for either construction
are equally sound. As a policy matter, however, pre-emption in
environment legislation should not be used to prevent states from
imposing more stringent requirements if the state is willing to forego
economic advantage in order to derive ecological benefits. Perhaps
the states should be allowed to experiment with various types of
control above a national minimum standard. The fear of adverse
economic effects on other states is real, but that concern may be
ameliorated by Commerce Clause protections, a topic to which we
now turn. 42
CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The ability of state and federal governments to legislate in
conformance with the Commerce Clause, 43 entangled as it is with
conflicting notions of federalism and the perceived need for national
uniformity and centralized control over interstate commerce, has
produced much litigation and commentary since the adoption of the
Constitution. Indeed, with the growth of interstate commerce in the
industrializing nation, the ability of the states to legislate vis-a-vis the
federal government has been a prominent issue. This section cannot
review all the nuances of the Commerce Clause debate; rather, it will
focus on the perceived dominant trends and will apply those
principles to the Tanker Law.
Basically, analysis of whether a state statute imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce requires a three-step inquiry:
44
(1) Does the statute reflect a legitimate state purpose?
(2) Are the means of regulation reasonably adopted to that
end?

45

(3) Does the state statute prevail when weighed against the
federal interest in preventing an undue burden on interstate
commerce? 46
42. The lower court did not reach this issue because of its decision on pre-emption grounds.
The Supreme Court, however, will hear arguments on both the pre-emption grounds and the
Commerce Clause question, supranote 10.
43. Supra note 22.
44. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
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If all three questions can be answered in the affirmative, then the
state statute does not constitutionally violate the Commerce Clause.
Generally, state statutes challenged as violating the Commerce
Clause originate as "health and safety" measures by the state. The
health and safety of the state's citizens are, of course, legitimate state
interests. However, since most state policies can be related to health
and safety (however tortuously), the Court, in its review, has often
gone beyond the expressed purpose of the statute to determine if the
substantive effect is legitimate. When the Court has proceeded
beyond the veil, three types of statutes have been held invalid: 47
(1) Where the state attempts to pursuade businesses to locate
within the state;
(2) Where the legislative motive might have been to protect
local businesses from out-of-state competition; and
(3) Where the state attempts to enrich its citizens by exacting
higher prices from nonresident purchasers.
All of these underlying purposes discriminate because they attempt
to secure an economic advantage for the state at the expense of other
states. However, to invalidate the Tanker Law on the theory that the
enunciated state purpose of health and safety is only a subterfuge
seems contrary to the obvious facts and would require a serious
deviation from cases in which the Court looked behind the state's
announced purpose. Washington's purpose is not economic gain or
retaliation against other states; rather, it is seeking to protect its
existing assets in its natural resources. Courts should differentiate such
cases from those in which the state attempts to restrict importation of
goods bought out-of-state for lower than the state's minimum price, 4 8
where the locality prohibits sales of a product manufactured at a
source beyond some distance from the locality,4 9 or where the state
attempts to forestall interstate commerce because the market is
adequately served already.50 In all of the latter cases, the relationship
between the state purpose of health, safety, and welfare become
impermissibly attenuated because the statute confers an economic
advantage in commerce to the state's citizens who are engaged in the
same commerce that is being regulated. The Washington Tanker
Law, in contrast, attempts to directly protect general state interests;
it is inconceivable that such a statute would act as an economic boon
to the state shipping industry or to any other state commercial entity.
47.
REV.
48.
49.
50.

Note, State Environmental ProtectionLegislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L.
1762, 1773-74 (1974).
Baldwin v. C.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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Moreover, a unanimous Court has held that state regulation of natural
gas prices in order to preserve the state's natural 51resources is
permissible because a legitimate state interest is at stake.
In determining whether a statutory restriction is reasonably
adopted to the state's legitimate purpose, the Court has shown an
obvious deference to the state legislative process:
When the action of a legislature is within the scope of its power,
fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, wisdom and
propriety are not for the determination of courts, but for the
legislative body, on which rest the duty and responsibility of
decision. . . .This is equally the case then the legislative power
is one which may legitimately place an incidental burden on
commerce . . . and courts are not any the more entitled, because
interstate commerce is affected, to substitute their cwn for
legislative judgment. 55
The Tanker Law, which imposes graduated restrictions according to
the size of the tanker, must present at least a "fairly debatable"
question of reasonableness since the extent of the potential damage to
the state is directly related to the size of the tanker involved.
The final issue under the Commerce Clause-that of weighing state
interest against federal interests-presents the strongest controversy.
The constitutional basis for disallowing complete state autonomy in
regard to interstate commerce is the real fear of "mutual jealousies
and aggressions of the states, taking form in customs barriers and
other economic retaliation."-5 3 The federal interests, therefore, are the
free flow of trade and uniformity of regulation.
Thus, when Congress has not spoken expressly or impliedly, so that
pre-emption cannot be considered, the Supreme Court is left the task
of balancing state and federal interests to insure that individual states
do not legislate beyond the power granted them under the Constitution. This balancing test had its origin in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, which held that imposition of state regulations on the maximum length of trains was an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce. 54 In Southern Pacific the federal interests in
the free flow of commerce and national uniformity outweighed the
state interest in safety.
Undoubtedly, the Tanker Law does impose some burdens on
interstate commerce. The largest tankers would be totally excluded
from the Puget Sound area; medium sized tankers would have to meet
51.
52.
53.
54.

Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
Supra note 44, at 190-91.
Supra note 49, at 522.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, supra note 46.
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more stringent requirements than those imposed for other ports.
Presumably, these medium sized tankers would have the choice of
either expending capital to meet the higher design and safety
regulations or importing at less desirable and more distant ports, thus
perhaps incurring higher transportation costs. But more burdens on
interstate commerce do not suffice, per se, to compel the conclusion
that violation of the Commerce Clause has occurred. 5 5 The Court
must decide that the burdens on interstate commerce exceed the local
56
benefits to be derived.
Because Washington's regulation does not impose standards which
would be prohibited in other ports, because Washington's regulation
does not altogether prohibit commerce in oil within the state, because
the Court traditionally gives great weight to environmental protection under the Commerce Clause, and because increased costs borne
by the oil transport companies can be passed on to the consumer, the
Court should decide that local interests are not exceeded by burdens
on interstate commerce, so that the Tanker Law should be ruled not
to violate the Commerce Clause. The Tanker Law should not be
considered as economic retaliation or as a means to economic gain for
Washington derived by penalizing inland states. Rather, it must be
viewed as a sharing of the costs of preventing severe environmental
harm among those states whose geographical position does not subject
them to the risk of such environmental damage. Any fear that coastal
states can, in the future, totally exclude valuable imports from their
ports may easily be dispelled by the fact that such action could not be
rationally related to any state objective and would certainly unduly
burden interstate commerce.
This case, then, presents the opportunity for the Supreme Court to
create a landmark decision which will set the tone for future
federal-state cooperation in the control of environmental damage. If
the Court finds the Tanker Law pre-empted, the effect will be that
the PWSA not only sets minimum standards for oceanic transport of
oil, but that those standards will also constitute the maximum
allowable standards. Control of harbor pollution would be stripped
from state control to a great extent. If the Court, on the other hand,
shows favoritism towards state environmental policy within the
limitations of the Commerce Clause, then control of this type of
potential environmental harm would be left, in part, to those
residents most immediately affected, and the states would be able to
55. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 352 U.S. 440 (1960) (smoke abatement
ordinance valid exercise of state power although this regulated ships engaged in interstate
commerce); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, supra note 18.
56. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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experiment with methods designed to decrease the likelihood of
devastating oil spills.
STEPHEN D. DILLON

